New Guard, No Guard
How Israel Built the World’s Most Advanced Military by Dismantling Its Own Ground Forces
by Brigadier General (Ret.) Guy Hazoot
The Book
New Guard, No Guard is a comprehensive analytical work that functions simultaneously as a military autopsy, a cultural critique, and a strategic manifesto. Written by Brigadier General (Ret.) Guy Hazoot, Chief Learning Officer of IDF Ground Forces during the 2023-2026 conflict, the book offers an unsparing account of military performance grounded in 34 years of combat experience and real-time access to ground units during the war.
Its central argument is provocative: the Israel Defense Forces have bifurcated into two unequal armies, a prestigious, well-funded hi-tech force (Air Force, Navy, Intelligence, Cyber) and a neglected cavalry army of ground forces. This imbalance, reinforced by societal values and class stratification, has produced a dangerous strategic illusion, that technology can substitute for ground maneuver, leaving even the most advanced militaries unable to achieve decisive victory.
The book traces the historical watershed moments that created this divide (the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 1982 Lebanon War), the sociological forces that deepened it, and offers a prescriptive roadmap for reform modeled on the U.S. Army’s post-Vietnam transformation. An extensive Epilogue provides a detailed, real-time analysis of the October 7 failure, the Gaza and Lebanon operations, and the direct confrontation with Iran in spring 2026.
Why This Book Matters
Most military writing on the current Middle East conflict falls into two categories: tactical after-action reporting for specialists, or broad political commentary for general readers. New Guard, No Guard fills the gap between them, an insider’s institutional analysis grounded in three decades of command experience and, critically, real-time access to the frontline during the very war it analyzes.
The book’s central claim is provocative and actionable: technology cannot substitute for ground maneuver, and militaries that treat it as a substitute rather than an enabler will keep winning battles while failing to achieve decisive victory. That argument reframes how defense planners, military educators, and policymakers should think about the balance between hi-tech capability and ground forces investment.
Because Hazoot served as Chief Learning Officer of IDF Ground Forces throughout the 2023-2026 war, the book’s analysis is not retrospective theory, it is drawn from internal documents, frontline interviews, and real-time strategic assessments gathered as events unfolded. Its relevance extends well beyond Israel: every advanced Western military wrestling with the same hi-tech/ground-forces imbalance will find a direct parallel here.
About the Book
Genre: Military Strategy / Institutional Analysis / Defense Policy
Word count: 155,000
Manuscript status: Previously published in Hebrew (2024) and translated into English. Additional translation rights available – to confirm current territories with Valcal Group.
For readers of military strategy and institutional-reform literature, New Guard, No Guard offers a rigorously argued, insider account of how technological superiority can coexist with strategic failure — and what militaries must do about it.
Author
Brigadier General (Ret.) Guy Hazoot — Former Chief Learning Officer, IDF Ground Forces | 34 Years of Military Service | Military Strategy Expert
Brigadier General (Ret.) Guy Hazoot served thirty-four years in the Israel Defense Forces, combining combat experience and command roles. His unique credential is his role as Chief Learning Officer of IDF Ground Forces during the ‘Swords of Iron’ war (2023-2026), giving him unprecedented real-time access to frontline units during active conflict and to classified institutional documents.
Hazoot identifies as a ‘loyal soldier’ and ‘Israeli patriot,’ enabling him to deliver honest, corrective criticism without political agenda. His professional voice is analytical and rigorous, bridging high military theory (Clausewitz, Sun Tzu) with visceral battlefield accounts, making complex institutional failures accessible to general readers as well as specialists.
Rights Status
Translation Rights Available: Previously published in Hebrew (2024) and translated into English. English publishing rights and additional translation rights available – to confirm current territories with Valcal Group.
Film Rights: Available
Audio Rights: Available
Comparable Titles
This book is suitable for readers who enjoyed:
- The Transformation of War by Martin van Creveld
- Unrestricted Warfare by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui
- Managing the Unexpected: Sustaining Performance in an Age of Complexity by Karl E. Weick and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe
BISAC / Thema Categories
- HIS027100 – HISTORY / Military / Strategy
- POL012000 – POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International)
- HIS027080 – HISTORY / Military / Iraq, Afghan & Gulf Wars
- BUS041000 – BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Management
Themes
- Military Reform
- Ground Forces vs. Hi-Tech Warfare
- Institutional Culture and Leadership
- Israel Defense Forces
- Swords of Iron War (2023-2026)
- October 7 and Its Aftermath
- Defense Policy
- Command and Organizational Failure
Keywords
For readers interested in:
- IDF ground forces
- Israeli military strategy
- Swords of Iron war
- October 7 analysis
- military institutional reform
- hi-tech vs. ground maneuver
- defense policy
- Gaza and Lebanon operations
FAQ
Is this book available for translation rights?
[To confirm — see Rights Status above]
Has this book been published before?
The book was originally published in Hebrew. English publishing rights are available.
Who is the ideal audience for this book?
Military professionals and defense analysts, political and national security advisors, sociologists and civil-military scholars, military history and geopolitics enthusiasts, leadership and organizational-reform professionals, and defense journalists and commentators.
What makes this book different from other military histories or memoirs?
The author served as Chief Learning Officer of IDF Ground Forces during the exact 2023-2026 conflict the book analyzes, giving him real-time access to internal documents, frontline interviews, and strategic assessments as events unfolded — not retrospective analysis written after the fact.
Does the book cover the October 7 attack and its aftermath?
Yes. An extensive Epilogue provides a detailed, chronological and thematic analysis of the October 7 failure, the subsequent Gaza and Lebanon operations, and the direct confrontation with Iran in spring 2026.
Is this book relevant to militaries outside of Israel?
Yes. The author argues the hi-tech/ground-forces imbalance it diagnoses is a problem facing advanced Western militaries broadly, with direct relevance to defense establishments in the US, UK, France, Germany, and other NATO allies.
Rights Agent's Notes
From a rights agent’s perspective, New Guard, No Guard has a selling point almost no competing title can match: the author’s vantage point. Hazoot did not observe this war from the outside — he served as Chief Learning Officer of IDF Ground Forces throughout it, with access to internal documents and frontline interviews as the events happened. That is a very hard credential to replicate, and it gives the book’s central argument (that technology cannot substitute for ground maneuver) real institutional weight rather than armchair theorizing.
The market timing is also unusually strong. Western defense establishments are actively debating exactly this hi-tech-versus-ground-forces question, and the book’s extensive Epilogue on October 7, Gaza, Lebanon, and the spring 2026 confrontation with Iran gives it a documentary value that dates quickly if not placed soon.
Worth flagging for prospective publishers: this is a critical, insider account of institutional failure inside the IDF. It is analytically rigorous and the author frames himself explicitly as a loyal patriot rather than a partisan critic, but acquiring editors in some markets may want to read the full manuscript closely for tone and political sensitivity before making an offer. We see the strongest fit with defense and security-studies imprints, military history publishers, and general nonfiction houses with a strategy/current-affairs list.